Introduction
Though often underestimated, the Upper House has gradually become a crucial institution in Thailand's emerging democracy. On March 2, 2008 , Thais went to the polls to elect a new Senate. This was only the third occasion for such an event in Thailand. The first elected Senate had taken office in 2000, only one year prior to the ascension to power of Thaksin Shinawatra and his Lower House party Thai Rak Thai (TRT) Upper Chambers: Are They Necessary?
Opponents of Upper Chambers argue that they encourage endless delays in the legislative process and enhance the clout of traditional powers, such as royalty and other propertied interests. There is also a fear that the addition of an Upper House would encumber the will of the majority (Bentham 1830 in Rockow 1928 . Still, bicameralism has had many advocates. Hamilton (1788) argued that bicameralism thwarts the misguided judgments of only one house and prevents a "tyranny of the majority" given its ability to rationally veto the emotional will of the fickle masses (Hamilton, Jay, and Madison 1961: 364, 379) . Also, perhaps the will of only ¼ of voters ("tyranny of the minority") could prevail, if not for the correcting hand of an Upper House (Buchanan and Tullock 1962) . Lijphart (1984) writes that Senates tend to deliberate in a much more "informal and relaxed manner" 1 Many thanks to Aurel Croissant for his advice and assistance.
than do the generally much larger Lower Houses (Lijphart 1984: 96) . Others argue that bicameralism decreases institutional corruption since more individuals would be needed for it to be successful than in a unicameral system (Levmore 1992: 156) . Tsebelis and Money (1997) meanwhile hold that bicameralism promotes stability, by making diversions from the status quo more difficult. At the same time, any changes must be structured through a process of "efficient" or "redistributive" measures. They conclude that uncertainties of the other chamber's patience combined with a structured series of legislative mechanisms help "second chambers alter legislative outcomes even if they do not have the power to veto legislation" (Tsebelis and Money 1997: 230) . During the 1970s, global trends appeared to be pushing towards a single chamber. Since then, there has been a growing move back towards two houses. Still, the International Parliamentary Union counts 114 unicameral and 77 bicameral parliaments around the globe (see table 1 ). As of 2009, Thailand had experienced 36 years of bicameralism and 41 years of unicameralism, with the latter specifically associated with military regimes. 
Method of Selection
Throughout the world's electoral systems, one can find extreme variations on methods of senator selection. Election is the most common method (over 50%, most by direct suffrage). Meanwhile, several Upper Houses are fully appointed. However these cases are usually in the process of democratization (e.g. Cambodia, Jordan) or else the Upper House has much less power than the Lower House (e.g. Canada). Between these two extremes are three variations. First, at least two countries use a mixed system of direct and indirect election (e.g. Spain, Belgium). Second, four states mingle direct election with appointment (e.g. Italy, Zimbabwe). Third, nineteen countries use a system combining indirect election and appointment (e.g. Ireland, Algeria). Where there is a mixing of systems (form of election/ type of appointment), the number of elected Senators normally greatly outweighs the number of appointed ones. Altogether five methods are currently utilized for the selection of Upper House membership across the world. Thailand first employed indirect election , then made use of simple appointment (1947-51; 1969-71; 1974-76; 1979-91; 1992-2000) , thereafter shifting to direct suffrage . But since 2008, the country has merged direct election with appointment (see table 2 ). Regarding a state's Upper House type (strong or weak bicameralism), this generally depends upon conditions specific to the country. Thus, a small population might indicate a weak Senate while strong federalism or strong separation of powers correlates with a strong one (Lijphart 1984: 99-105) . Ultimately, there is much variation in the structure and roles of Upper Houses worldwide. Analyzing Thailand's own Senate has been problematical for three reasons. First, aside from works published by the Upper House itself, literature on Thailand's Senate per se has been sparse. Second, the lack of any coherent theory on the role of second chambers makes it difficult to evaluate that of Thailand. Third, democratization in Thailand has been highly discontinuous, with recurrent systemic modifications. Nevertheless, some general patterns are evident. As a unitary country with a small-average population and no tradition of separation of powers, Thai democratic regimes have experienced weak bicameralism. But during times when the country's military has carved itself a reserved domain in the Upper House (e.g. 1968 House (e.g. -71, 1979 House (e.g. -2000 , parliament has experienced strong bicameralism. Where Thai Senates have existed, the intended role of each seems to have been to assist executives in stabilizing the perceived capriciousness of the Lower House. Returning to the military, when it dominated Thailand, Senates were often utilized to bypass Lower Houses and rubber-stamp the will of executives. Other times they reflected the interests of powerful civilians (e.g. Pridi Panomyong in 1946-47; royalists in 1947 -51, 1975 Thaksin Shinawatra in 2004-06) . In only three instances have Senates resisted executives (1947-51; 2001-04; 2008-09) Unicameralism, Bicameralism, and Thailand's Military: 1932-2000 Since the end of absolute monarchy in 1932, Thailand has alternated between using bicameralism and unicameralism, though only a two-chamber system has been employed when the country has had a democratic regime. Thai constitutional drafters generally modelled their parliament on features specifically from France, the United Kingdom, and Germany (Avudh 2007). The country's experiences with constitutionally engineering and re-engineering its Senates have led it to sometimes strengthen the Senate and other times weaken it. Each time drafters have formulated constitutions, they have looked to models across the globe. The size of Thailand's Upper Chamber has ranged from 80 to 270 members, depending on the constitution. The country has had 11 Senates, following eight different constitutional typologies.
Thailand's first (the Prudhi Sapha of 1946-47) was indirectly elected by a committee composed of 178 members of the Lower House who had been directly elected by the people. This Senate was created for the professed purpose of providing wise consideration on legislation and suggestions on governmental behaviour. Yet a more instantaneous aim is alleged to have been "a demand by appointed members of the previous national assembly that positions of dignity be prepared for them before they gave approval to the revised constitution" (Wilson 1962: 207) . Thus, they could continue occupying privileged posts of political power. Another potential purpose for the Senate's establishment was to lengthen the authority of Pridi Panomyong and his followers in parliament even beyond the life-span of the Lower House (Senate terms were six years while Lower House terms were only four). 2 Indeed, the 1946 elections saw Pridi's faction become dominant in both houses of parliament. But only two weeks after the Upper House election, King Rama VIII was found dead. Thereupon, Pridi's prestige rapidly diminished. The coup leaders of 1947 decided to end the Senate's term, given that it was packed with Pridi's supporters (Wilson 1962: 264) . For the next 63 years, the Upper House was influenced by the military. 2 Pridi, through his majority control of the Lower House, was able to fill the Senate with his supporters. See Wilson 1962: 264; " Kiat" 1950: 97-101. The following seven Senates (thereafter referred to as Wuthi Sapha) were all appointed with five especially dominated by the military. During this time, the Senate had greater power than did the Lower House, reflecting the authority of Thai generals at this time. Ironically it was the military's control of the Senate which contributed to the strengthening of the Upper House through which the military boosted its own constitutionally-derived political powers. Such powers included the following: the Senate Speaker was automatically president of parliament; senators could participate in no-confidence motions; active military personnel could serve as senators. After "Black May" 1992 , the military, however, lost some of its clout. The seventh Senate saw the Speaker of the House become the president of parliament while the appointed Senate could only screen legislation (Surin 1992: 21-22, 34 
Thailand's Ninth Senate
Though previous Senates had been mere military-dominated rubber stamps, under the 1997 Constitution, the Senate became an essential arm of Thailand's emerging democracy. As such, it had nine principal roles. First, monitoring and reviewing legislative, organic law, and appropriations bills passed by the Lower House, as well as endorsing Emergency Decrees. Second, it could select most of the members of Thailand's post-1997 autonomous bodies, including members of the Constitutional Court, State Audit Commission, and the Office of the Ombudsman. Third, the Senate could remove office holders deemed to have committed corruption or abused their powers of office in some like fashion. Fourth, the Senate could inquire into any matter within the powers of the Senate through Standing Committees, Ad Hoc Committees, and sub-committees. Fifth, the Upper House could approve important issues such as appointing a Regent, the succession to the Throne, declaring war, and concluding peace treaties. Sixth, the Senate could acknowledge reports of the Ombudsmen, National Human Rights Commission, the National Counter Corruption Commission, and the Constitutional Court. Seventh, the Senate could engage in general debate regarding the administration of state affairs (though no resolution may be passed) (Constitution 1997, chapter 6, part 3, sections 121-135, section 187, chapter 10, part 3, sections 303-307). Eighth, the Senate could meet when the Lower House was not in session with regard to matters of royal succession or when appointing or removing persons from office. Finally, the Upper House could offer advice to the Prime Minister. These new post-1997 abilities of the Senate added teeth to the body, transforming Thailand's legislature into what Lijphart might refer to as "strong bicameralism" (see above). Thus, the Upper Chamber now took an active role in the institutionalization of Thai democracy (see figure 1 below). The new Senate was innovative in many other aspects. First, Senators were for the first time directly elected by the people. Second, the number of Senators was fixed at 200 with senatorial terms lasting six years. In the past, the Senate's numbers had generally stood at three quarters of the House number (which had grown every election based on population censuses). Third, Senators were not allowed to consecutively contest senatorial terms. Though this requirement was designed to lessen the chances of politicians becoming dynastic office holders, they could easily have spouses or relatives proxy for them after the end of their terms. Fourth, Senators could not be members of political parties. Nevertheless, approximately 75% of all Senators were implicitly connected with parties. Fifth, Senators lost their positions should they absent themselves from 25% of the senatorial term (without permission from the Senate Speaker). Sixth, Senators had to possess at least a Bachelor's degree and must be at least 40 years old. Though this provision was seen as boosting the degree of wisdom and maturity among Senators, it also excluded those candidates unable to afford a college education. Seventh, Senators could not simultaneously hold other political appointments. Eighth, in electoral campaigns, senatorial candidates could only introduce themselves or have the state introduce them, and advertise themselves through posters/ notices. All other strategies such as public speeches were forbidden. The Thai government rationalized this last requirement as preventing partisan financial support in Senate elections as well as promoting only "an honourable, well-known, and high-qualified person" as the candidate (Secretariat of the Senate 2001: 23). Yet this rule tended to privilege senatorial candidates who were either personally famous, from well-known families, or individually wealthy.
Electorally, the novel Senate used single member district (non-transferable vote) plurality formula with hare remainder. A changwat (province) acted as an electoral constituency and each voter possessed a single vote. However, the number of Senators in each changwat was determined, first by dividing the number of the population of Thailand (as determined in the latest census) by the number of Senators (200). This quotient was then divided into the number of the population of each changwat. If these calculations resulted in less than 200 senators for the entire country, then the changwat with the largest fraction remaining gained an additional Senator. This process continued by changwat (largest to smallest fraction) until the number of Senators totalled 200. Single Member District (SMD) was an important device in the democratic stabilization of the Senate. Though such a system certainly promoted simple electoral stability in allowing the winner to take all votes in a simple plurality, the structure could be criticized for ignoring and wasting the votes of those who voted for all other candidates (especially where a high number of candidates contested elections). The system further assisted candidates with the most money or name recognition to win.
The 2000 Senate Election
March 4, 2000 thus marked a pivotal point in Thailand's democratization and a key part of 1997 reformism since it saw the country's first direct senatorial election. The new Election Commission of Thailand (ECT), the state's recently established election watchdog agency, officially oversaw the voting. The ECT was assisted by numerous nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) -the first time NGOs had been allowed such a direct role in Thai elections (Surin 2002: 204) . Voter-turnout was high, with as many as 70% of registered voters participating. This figure certainly owed to the new regulation making voting compulsory, though many voters were clearly enthusiastic about increased rights to exercise their civic duty. After reviewing 108 complaints of voting irregularities from 43 provinces, the ECT eventually overturned the elections of 78 winning candidates in 35 provinces and ordered repeat elections. Ultimately, the senatorial elections went through five rounds, until July 22, 2000 . Table 4 illustrates the Senate seat breakdown following the election. Of 1,521 candidates competing for 200 seats, 114 were women. Of elected Senators, 90% were men, while 10% were women. This marked an improvement for women's representation in the Upper Chamber. The shift owes perhaps to the fact that in the pre-2000 appointed body, almost all Senators were male. The democratic quality of the post-2000 Senate thus facilitated the shift. In terms of education, 52.5% (105) of Senators possessed at least a Bachelor's degree while 7% (14) had a Ph.D. This might beg the question as to whether voters really value high education for their representatives (or education at all). In terms of occupation, the highest number of Senators, 28% (56), listed themselves as pensioners. Such an ambiguous term implied that perhaps many "pensioners" were in fact politicians. A much smaller number were from the social welfare/ labour sector (5% (10)). Also, a tiny though vocal number of new Senators (1.5% (3)) were affiliated with the mass media. However, the number of Senators formerly members of the military or police was a mere 2% (4) (Secretariat of the Senate 2001: 75). The Senate election seemed to be a victory for Thai democratic reformism. But it was deficient in several areas. First, the official non-political character of the senatorial elections (as enshrined in the constitution) proved to be unrealistic. Surin (2002: 205) claimed that winning senatorial candidates with tight political connections comprised 75% of the new Senate while mostly only Bangkokians elected most of the 18 Senators because of non-political reasons. As a result, despite the transition from appointed old-guard Senate to directly elected, reformist Senate, most of the Upper House maintained its conservative character. Secondly, the "dirty politics" of vote-buying, seen as a thing of the past, reared its forgotten head in the Senate elections (both in the provinces as well as in Bangkok). This despite constitutional changes to the electoral system that had apparently made vote-buying much more difficult to engage in, especially with regard to senatorial elections where candidates were much more limited in campaigning than their brethren in the Lower House. The occurrence of such unbridled electoral irregularities led to the third problem: the aforementioned five rounds of re-elections (as mandated by an ECT determined to cleanse and re-cleanse tainted voting) which also succeeded in delaying senatorial work.
The elected second chamber got off to a quick activist beginning, appointing members of independent "watchdog" bodies, monitoring Lower House bills, issuing numerous reports, and investigating a myriad of controversial issues. For example, Kraisak Choonhavan, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, led his members on a mission to investigate the narcotics problem on the Thai-Burmese border. In October 2000, the Upper House voted 148-9 to enhance the powers of the independent Electoral Commission, giving the body the right to search private residences for evidence of electoral fraud and allowing it to issue "modified red cards" whereby Lower House candidates could be disqualified without criminal charges being filed.
Despite 
Thailand's 2006 Senatorial Election
The 2006 senatorial election witnessed voter turnout at a lower-than-expected 63% despite the fact that voting is required (Bangkok Post 2006c) . This perhaps owed to the election occurring just after the April 2 Lower House snap election. The poll saw 27.5 of 45 million eligible voters choosing 200 of 1,477 candidates vying for seats in the elections. According to People's Network for Elections (P-Net), a democracy watchdog, vote-buying was rife, with the cost of a vote ranging from 20 THB (53 U.S. cents) to 1,000 THB (26.50 USD). Meanwhile, the Asian Network for Free Elections criticized the election for using small, nameless ballots as well as for banning senatorial campaigning. The group also slammed Thailand's Election Commission for inefficiency and incompetence in managing the poll (The Nation 2006a). 2006). However, certifications ended when one ECT commissioner resigned and three others were found guilty of malfeasance on July 26. For a few months, Thailand possessed two Upper Houses: an incumbent body and a Senate in Waiting. Given the Election Commission's sluggishness in confirming new Senators and inability to complete its duties, the incumbent Senate held a special session to wrap up all outstanding work.
By September 2006, it seemed an insidious irony that the Senate, blamed by many as a bastion of bribery, lethargy, and a rubber stamp for the executive, was being called upon by the nation to choose non-corrupt, neutral commissioners for the ECT. That was a tall order for a body which had installed highly-politicized pro-TRT loyalists into "independent" bodies). Now the Senate was being counted on to select a new ECT and help usher in a new Senate. 3 The speed and ability of this Senate to finish its work on these matters would furthermore determine the eventual date of a new election for the Lower House -which might have to be pushed to 2007. Amidst these events, the military coup d'etat against Thaksin occurred (19 September 2006). The 1997 Constitution, the Senate, and Thailand's democratic regime were immediately terminated.
Evaluating Thailand's Directly Elected Senate
Thailand's 2000-2006 Upper House proved to be a great disappointment for the 1997 Constitution drafters. Senators, who were supposed to be nonpartisan under the rules, were actually quite political. Indeed, though political party affiliations did not exist, the Senate became divided into camps, one pro-TRT, and the other vaguely pro-Democrat. First, there was the initial diehard group of senatorial supporters who were clandestinely tied to TRT through election or regional identity -only 10% of all Senators. Sec-3
Pressure from all sides -Thaksin, civil society, and the Privy Council led the incumbent Senate to race through selecting five new election commissioners, whose appointments were being readied to be confirmed by the Palace on the day of the September 19 coup. See The Nation 2006d.
ond, as time went on, Senator-businesspeople needing Thaksin's aid increasingly backed him in the Senate. Third, those Senators, with family relatives affiliated with TRT, became drawn into Thaksin's orbit. Fourth, those Senators who wanted their relatives supported or elected by TRT became apt to support Thaksin. Fifth, there were Senators supportive of Thaksin because they were paid off by TRT. Sixth, as the end of the term drew near in 2006, there were Senators who sided with the government because they wanted to please the one in power (and thus possibly the administration would help them out later). 4 Ultimately then, Senate candidates (successful or not) were mostly dominated by affiliations based on family, indirect links to political parties, factional connections, business, or general patronage. Often these linkages were simply a means to skirt the rule prohibiting consecutive senatorial terms. Meanwhile, Senate committees had no power to subpoena individuals to testify. As a result, the Senate could not force officials to testify and exact punishment on those deserving it. 5 Finally, senatorial successes were few and far between: the upper chamber's legislative process was either slow and cumbersome or simply failed to work as an instrument of checks and balances. The only useful parts of the Senate had in fact been committee investigations. 8 In a country where elected representatives were often negatively viewed as corrupt while the pre-2000 Senate had generally been appointed, the apparent growing partisanship and corruption in the elected Senate was seen as a dilemma requiring immediate resolution. Such dissatisfaction led to the redesigning of the Senate in 2007.
Reforming Thailand's Upper Chamber
Following the September 19, 2006 army putsch, the Council for National Security established a National Legislative Assembly (NLA) to act as a unicameral caretaker 242-member parliament until the next general election. The NLA established a Constitution Drafting Assembly (CDA) to draft Thailand's 18 th constitution. The CDA created a Constitution Drafting Committee CDC to spearhead constitutional modifications.
In early 2007, powerful voices, including those of coup leader Gen. Sondhi Boonyaratglin, Prime Minister Gen. Surayud Chulanond, NLA Speaker Meechai Ruchuphan, and CDC head Prasong Soonsiri increasingly pressed for a Senate devoid of partisanship, nepotism, money politics, and institutional weakness. As such, the CDC began examining various blueprints for a new Upper House. Too weak a Senate would become another rubber stamp; too strong a Senate might lead to gridlock; no Senate might mean no review of bills from the Lower House. Most importantly, if the drafters really wanted to promote pluralism, they needed to ensure that the Senate would remain an arena where representatives of Thai people could express themselves. An appointed Senate, especially one hosting allies of the military, would be unacceptable to any country striving towards democracy, decentralization, and accountability (Chambers and Waitoolkiat 2007) . Still, as early as January, the drafters were already mulling the probability of both downsizing the Senate and making it an appointed rather than an elected body (The Nation 2007a). Although the CDC was given the job of devising the new Senate (under a new constitution), Thai voters were ultimately given the power to approve or reject the draft in an August, 2007 referendum, the first in Thailand's history. Yet the state made few attempts to expeditiously and meaningfully educate Thailand's populace about the document prior to the vote.
On April 10, 2007, Thailand's Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC), reaching agreement on the constitution's first draft, voted in favour of making the Senate an appointed rather than an elected body. The new Upper House would have 160 members -all appointed, 76 representing provinces (one per province), and 84 representing various functional groups in Thai society. A selection committee of five people -three from the courts plus the House speaker and opposition leader -would select future senators. One innovation (not included in the final draft) would have stated that after every three years, half or 37 of the appointed senators would draw lots in a screening process that would allow new appointments.
The new Senate formula faced immediate criticism. Phairoj Pholphet of the Union for Civil Liberties (UCL) opined that the Senate blueprint was undemocratic, as it "gave absolute power to a selection committee while barring participation from the people" (Subhatra 2007). Meanwhile, Suriyasai Katasila of the Campaign for Popular Democracy (CPD) said that an appointed Senate would promote a system of patronage while the process of appointing Senators could be easily influenced (The Nation 2007b). Finally, Somchai Srisutthirvakorn of the People's Network for Elections (P-Net) argued that there was no evidence an appointed Senate could somehow perform more satisfactorily than an elected one (The Nation 2007c).
In early June, following reviews by various organizations (including the junta), the CDC completed the second draft of the constitution. The new version called for a 150-seat Senate with some members elected and others appointed. Each of Thailand's 75 provinces (plus Bangkok) would possess a Senator elected through the method of plurality/ single member district where district magnitude equals the entire province (Section 112, Constitution 2007). The remaining 74 senators would be appointed from candidates nominated by organizations from various sectors: academia (15), government (14), the private sector (15), the professional sector (15), and miscellaneous (15). Nominating organizations must be established in Thailand for at least three years (Section 114, Constitution 2007). Also, they had to be non-political (the method by which the selection committee determines this condition is unknown) as well as non-profit-making. This was a requirement which would appear to be at odds with allowing private sector organizations nominate candidates (Section 127, Organic Act 2007). But criticisms dogged this final blueprint. Ex-Senator Karun Saingam contended that the appointment process amounted to a conflict of interest. Since the new Senate could appoint or impeach Senate-selection-committee officials while the committee picked Senators, there was a fear that malfeasant relations could develop between members of the Senate and judiciary. Meanwhile, ex-Senator Chirmsak Pinthong stated that the panel's appointment of almost half the Senators would lead to candidates vying for support from high-ranking bureaucrats, throwing Thailand back to the patronage system (Weerayut 2007). Komsan Phokong, a charter-writer, stressed that there could be further conflict-of-interest problems since the Senate-appointed Constitution Court president, while acting as head of the selection committee, might be asked to rule on selection disputes (The Nation 2007d). Former Election commissioner Gothom Ariya furthermore charged that by modifying the Senate, the CDC "wanted to readjust the balance of power [from the electorate] and give more say to the bureaucracy" (quoted in Fuller 2007 ). Yet another problem with the new Senate involved the associations which could nominate senatorial candidates. There were no "organizations" for farmers or those in menial occupations. Thus, professional groups or elites could dominate the Senate (Pravit 2007a). A related issue arose regarding the military's demand that each of the services -the Army, Navy, and Air Force -be allowed to nominate five candidates (rather than one candidate under the regulations) given that the armed forces possessed a much larger membership than most other organized sectoral groups. Some charter writers feared that giving way to the military demand would mean enhanced power for the military and bureaucracy in the Senate. The CDC was never able to reach a decision on the number of military Senate nominees and thus it was left ambiguous (Pravit 2007b).
The new Senate rules proved both similar to and different from the previous Senate. The Senate under both the 1997 and 2007 Constitutions mandated that Senators had to be at least 40 years of age and holders of at least a Bachelor's degree (Section 115 [ Ultimately, the Senate, as enshrined in the 2007 Constitution, was now more directly responsive to popular petition drives either for legislation or removing officials from office. Simultaneously, the new Senate formula appeared to be part of a pattern running through the new constitution: less power for elected politicians and political parties; more power for Thailand's judiciary, military, and related bureaucracy. Indeed it appeared that Thailand had now made a semi-U-turn back to the pre-1997 constitutional system in at least partially appointing its Senate.
Thailand's 2008 Senate Selection/ Election: 74 Appointed/ 76 Elected Would Thailand's new Senate be less partisan and more efficacious in carrying out its duties? This was the hope of the 2007 charter drafters. 1.8 billion THB was earmarked for the EC to organize the election of 76 senators and appointment process of 74 others (The Nation 2007e). As for the appointments, the new seven-person senatorial selection committee agreed to accept senatorial nominations (for selection-quota positions) in early January 2008. The selection committee consisted of six persons since the Supreme Court chief justice was concurrently serving as acting head of the Constitution Court (Atthayuth 2007). All committee members had been appointed under the junta-created interim government, were anti-Thaksin crusaders, or had participated in the annulling of the 2006 electoral victory of Thai Rak Thai. In order to reduce the expected large pool of candidates, an EC-appointed panel vetted the credentials of the Senate nominees before allowing them to proceed to the committee. The aim was to gather together senators who would be representatives from professional groups, private enterprise, the public sector, academics, NGOs, labour groups, religious organizations, and others.
Meanwhile, 34 members of the 216-member 2006-8 National Legislative Assembly resigned from their seats to vie for Senate seats. These included 10 potential anti-Thaksin stalwarts (The Nation 2008a). In the end, 1,087 selection-quota candidates were nominated by various state and societal organizations. The nominating organizations were quite disparate, including a Chumphon-based Durian Growers Association, a temple-related foundation, and an association of apartment-business owners. The selection committee screened these applicants, specifically rejecting any nominees whose candidacies did not correspond to the rules (e.g. nominees belonging to political parties were discarded as were those who had not left politics in the previous five years). Ultimately, 148 were actually short-listed for the selection of the final 74 by the selection committee. The final 74 were announced on February 19 (The Nation 2008b; 2008c) .
The 74 were predominantly (retired) business-folk or government officials and most were aged in their 50s or 60s (five senators were in their 40s while a single septuagenarian (Lt Col Kamol Prachupamoh, 72) had won election). Only 17 appointed senators came from the functions of NGOs or academia -non-private enterprise dimensions of civil society. This functional tilt ensured that the appointed Senators would have a conservative edge and be dominated by a nexus of bureaucrats and entrepreneurs. Meanwhile, the military and police were granted a pseudo-reserved domain (an indirectly set-aside sphere of influence) within the appointed grouping of Senators. Five out of 14 Senators in the Government Sector were previously military/ police personnel. This included two representatives from the Army and one each from the Air Force, Navy, and Police. Finally this Senate grouping included a former Deputy Secretary General of the Council of National Security. All in all, 9.3% (14/ 150) of the Upper House is com-prised of retired military. This included six former police, four former army, two former air force, and two former navy officials -as well as the former aforementioned NSC official (based on author's calculations).
The election date was set for March 2, 2008 with one elected senator per province. Senators contesting polls were elected using the aforementioned formula of winner-take-all single member district (with the electoral district equal to one province or the Bangkok Metropolitan Area, BMA) for a total of 76 Senators (75 provinces The Senate election outcome reflected the selectoral identity of its winners, both appointed and elected. Table 8 Still, political parties of all shades and hues have voiced their intentions to amend the constitution to allow once again for an elected Senate. Most recently, Prime Ministers Samak and Somchai sought to make such changes. Prime Minister Abhisit has likewise supported an eventual constitutional modification for a more pluralistic Senate. Perhaps as stability returns to Thailand in the wake of the December 2008 political crisis, political forces across the spectrum will eventually allow a return to the country's trajectory towards greater democracy. In such an environment -and with elite actors acquiescing -Thailand's Upper House can once more be a directly-elected body.
Bicameralism is perhaps more appropriate for Thailand than is unicameralism. Given the array of forces in the country (the palace, royalist demonstrators [the PAD], pro-Thaksin demonstrators [the UDD] the military, police, political parties, business conglomerates and associations, various NGOs), if an unicameralist system became dominated by a single party, the result could rapidly facilitate parliamentary domination and national strife. Conversely, a two-chamber system offers all of these political players an institutional voice.
Meanwhile, the Senate can and should be made more effective than under the 1997 Constitution. For example, mechanisms should be enacted to monitor senatorial elections more closely; senatorial campaigning should be allowed; senatorial behaviour should be more closely monitored; committees should have greater subpoena power. Such reforms might diminish vote- Continuing electoral victories by candidates favoured by Thaksin Shinawatra contributed to a distaste among Thaksin opponents for the electoral method which ushered in the Senates of 2000 and 2006. Indeed, the People's Alliance for Democracy, charging that Thaksin's enormous rural constituency merely sold their votes, favours a "New Politics" where it initially sought to make parliament 70% appointed but now opts to transform the electoral system such that 50% of Parliament is elected by geographic area and the other 50% by occupational representatives. See Komchadluek 2008. buying; improve the electoral chances of lesser-known candidates (though also perhaps increase vote-buying); reduce malfeasance in office; and enhance the Senate's legal muscle. But Senators will forever be moved by partisanship and politics; bribery is always a possibility; there will be times when executives reduce the checks-and-balances abilities of the Upper House (simply by sharing an affinity with the senatorial majority). In fact, Thailand's more democratic (since 1997) Upper House has ironically opened up an enclave through which provincial vested interests can acquire or deepen their agglomeration of power through added postings and a new sources of budgetary resources. Indeed, though the 2007 charter sought to prevent family dynasties from being established in the Senate, cronies and distant relatives of Senators can still succeed them. Thailand will never have a perfect Senate or flawless constitution. But the Upper House, as a changing organ of Thailand's constitution, can be a major engine driving the country's evolving pluralism. It should be an efficient instrument for checks and balances, reassessing Lower House actions, and launching inquiries. At the same time, its goal of efficiency should be carefully balanced with the objective of political empowerment -the Senate must increasingly become a voice for Thai people. Only such equilibrium can provide Thailand's Senate with a successful, stable future.
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